In response to feedback from operational security communities,
CAIDA's source address validation measurement project
(https://spoofer.caida.org) is automatically generating monthly
reports of ASes originating prefixes in BGP for systems from which
we received packets with a spoofed source address.
We are publishing these reports to network and security operations
lists in order to ensure this information reaches operational
contacts in these ASes.
This report summarises tests conducted within nld.
Inferred improvements during May 2020:
ASN Name Fixed-By
6830 LGI-UPC 2020-05-27
Further information for the inferred remediation is available at:
https://spoofer.caida.org/remedy.php
Source Address Validation issues inferred during May 2020:
ASN Name First-Spoofed Last-Spoofed
44684 MYTHIC 2018-02-25 2020-05-15
8587 Infracom 2019-10-28 2020-05-27
209299 VITOX-TELECOM 2019-12-15 2020-05-16
208046 HostSlick-Germany 2020-05-13 2020-05-13
41436 CloudWebManage-EU 2020-05-22 2020-05-29
Further information for these tests where we received spoofed
packets is available at:
https://spoofer.caida.org/recent_tests.php?country_include=nld&no_block=1
Please send any feedback or suggestions to spoofer-info(a)caida.org
In response to feedback from operational security communities,
CAIDA's source address validation measurement project
(https://spoofer.caida.org) is automatically generating monthly
reports of ASes originating prefixes in BGP for systems from which
we received packets with a spoofed source address.
We are publishing these reports to network and security operations
lists in order to ensure this information reaches operational
contacts in these ASes.
This report summarises tests conducted within nld.
Inferred improvements during Apr 2020:
ASN Name Fixed-By
6830 LGI-UPC 2020-04-21
Further information for the inferred remediation is available at:
https://spoofer.caida.org/remedy.php
Source Address Validation issues inferred during Apr 2020:
ASN Name First-Spoofed Last-Spoofed
9009 M247 2017-01-10 2020-04-02
48693 NTSERVICE 2020-04-05 2020-04-06
Further information for these tests where we received spoofed
packets is available at:
https://spoofer.caida.org/recent_tests.php?country_include=nld&no_block=1
Please send any feedback or suggestions to spoofer-info(a)caida.org
Dear all,
Now that most of us are working from home, events are cancelled or
postponed and so we have less social interaction as a community, we are
organising a daily virtual Coffee Break. During the break we can have our
daily moment at the coffee machine.
When: daily @ 11am
Where:
https://nlnog-net.zoom.us/j/97671084794?pwd=cG11aTUxbkFmTmlYUUZ5cFFGaUxMUT09
More detail: https://nlnog.net/nlnog-coffee-break/
Looking forward to seeing you there.
Cheers,
Melchior
Beste mede-netwerkers,
Over 2 weken is er weer de RIPE "General Meeting" waarbij gestemd gaat
worden voor 3 zetels in het Executive Board van RIPE NCC. Deze
verkiezingen zijn belangrijk: we maken allemaal gebruik van IP addressen
(wat moeten we anders weggeven bij de NLNOG Quiz?!) en hebben baat bij
een stabiele organisatie voor de registratie van Internet nummers.
Volgens de nummbers op https://www.ripe.net/participate/meetings/gm/meetings/may-2020
lijken er nog niet zo heel veel Nederlandse RIPE members zich
geregistreerd te hebben!
Om te stemmen moeten members zich *vooraf* registreren, dit kan met een
paar muisklikken via:
https://www.ripe.net/participate/meetings/gm/meetings/may-2020/registration
RIPE NCC's bestuur is verantwoordelijk voor de financieen, wat weer
invloed heeft op hoeveel geld er beschikbaar is om zaken als RPKI, RIPE
RIS draaiende te houden. Als je tevreden bent met hoe dingen gaan op dit
moment, dan is een stem uitbrengen de ideale methode dat zo te houden!
Voorkom eventuele spijt de stembus gemist te hebben na het horen van de
uitslag, dus registreer vandaag! :-)
Met vriendelijke groeten,
Job
In response to feedback from operational security communities,
CAIDA's source address validation measurement project
(https://spoofer.caida.org) is automatically generating monthly
reports of ASes originating prefixes in BGP for systems from which
we received packets with a spoofed source address.
We are publishing these reports to network and security operations
lists in order to ensure this information reaches operational
contacts in these ASes.
This report summarises tests conducted within nld.
Inferred improvements during Mar 2020:
ASN Name Fixed-By
9009 M247 2020-03-04
6830 LGI-UPC 2020-03-22
Further information for the inferred remediation is available at:
https://spoofer.caida.org/remedy.php
Source Address Validation issues inferred during Mar 2020:
ASN Name First-Spoofed Last-Spoofed
31400 ACCELERATED-IT 2016-02-18 2020-03-12
9009 M247 2017-01-10 2020-03-24
1136 KPN 2019-09-04 2020-03-03
8587 Infracom 2019-10-28 2020-03-12
209299 VITOX-TELECOM 2019-12-15 2020-03-10
Further information for these tests where we received spoofed
packets is available at:
https://spoofer.caida.org/recent_tests.php?country_include=nld&no_block=1
Please send any feedback or suggestions to spoofer-info(a)caida.org
Hallo NLNOG,
Nou, wij hebben eindelijk ook een datum! :-)
Op 25 Maart gaat de RPKI boel aan bij NTT en zal AS 2914 invalids
rejecten op alle EBGP sessies (customers, peers, de hele mikmak).
Meer informatie is beschikbaar hier: https://www.us.ntt.net/support/policy/rr.cfm#RPKI
Met vriendelijke groeten,
Job
Dear all,
I threw together a slidedeck today on the potential impact and second
order effects of COVID-19 on Internet network operations.
http://instituut.net/~job/netops_during_pandemics.pdf
I hope we together over time can add and extend projections in the deck
on what will happen and how we can mitigate the negative effects on
Internet operations.
We have to answer questions such as:
1) what problems already exist today because of a few weeks of C19?
2) What problems are still coming? Will those be localized or globally?
3) What possible workarounds can we plan for those problems?
I would appreciate feedback, comments, corrections or whatever you want
to tell me. None of us have been in this situation before, so my guess
is as good as yours.
Kind regards,
Job
Dear all,
A plea - do NOT terminate anyone's internet or hosting service for silly
pre-corona reasons such as 'we want money'. Right now we are facing a
pandamic of propotions nobody alive has ever seen. Act responsibily and
accordingly: do not shut anything down. Please! :-)
To illustrate, in the Netherlands we have been put on lockdown because
of the C19 biohazard - you are expected to *only* leave your house if it
is absolutely critical to leave your house, such as to pick up food from
the food distribution centers, get meds, go work in a hospital, etc.
At the same time... we have no idea where everyone is and who is using
what Interconnect to do what vital work. Maybe I'm fixing some important
BGP thingy via my neighbor's wifi? Maybe she didn't pay her bills?
Should she be cut off? Maybe next to her someone was freeloading on
that same wifi to look up medical data? Why risk the collatoral damage
of cutting anyone off?
The *safest* thing to do right now is to not terminate anyone's access
to information (be it connectivity, storage, compute, whatever).
We'll mop up society's collective bills at a later point in time, after
we deal with the immediate urgency at hand. And during this crisis we
have to keep this Internet thing running and available to anyone who may
need it.
Kind regards,
Job
ps. please remove rate limiters / data caps where possible. Now is not a
time to say 'you only paid for 1 megabit, you only get one megabit'.
Make it so that where possible, the access pipes be utilised to the
fullest extend. Don't throttle anyone, you never know whose lives were
depending on fast access.
In short: we need more thinking in this direction than the opposite:
https://www.bit.nl/news/2644/88/BIT-verdubbelt-kosteloos-de-bandbreedte-voo…
In response to feedback from operational security communities,
CAIDA's source address validation measurement project
(https://spoofer.caida.org) is automatically generating monthly
reports of ASes originating prefixes in BGP for systems from which
we received packets with a spoofed source address.
We are publishing these reports to network and security operations
lists in order to ensure this information reaches operational
contacts in these ASes.
This report summarises tests conducted within nld.
Inferred improvements during Feb 2020:
none inferred
Source Address Validation issues inferred during Feb 2020:
ASN Name First-Spoofed Last-Spoofed
9009 M247 2017-01-10 2020-02-29
28685 ASN-ROUTIT 2017-03-26 2020-02-27
6830 LGI-UPC 2017-06-14 2020-02-29
8587 Infracom 2019-10-28 2020-02-26
209299 2019-12-15 2020-02-20
Further information for these tests where we received spoofed
packets is available at:
https://spoofer.caida.org/recent_tests.php?country_include=nld&no_block=1
Please send any feedback or suggestions to spoofer-info(a)caida.org
Hello folks,
I would like to announce an Open Source project I’m working on it. It
is an Ansible collection focused on network management and peering
relations, in this release it is possible to gather your devices
configuration and sync then with a repository manager
like Gogs, and collect PeeringDB information’s like IRR-ASPATH, max
IPv4/IPv6 prefixes, and with IRR-ASPATH use BGPq3/BGPq4 to generate the
announced prefixes that with some Jinja templates it’s possible to
automatically generate a multi-brand routing policies and configurations.
In the next version of the Collection the configuration templates will
be available for some vendors like MikroTik, Cisco, Juniper and others.
The project ains to aid ISP and network operators to administrate their
network, in the next release I'm going to bring concepts like model based
configuration where the network, using YANG based models, writen in YAML,
will describe their network and the built-in Ansible Roles will parse and
deploy the configuration.
Finnaly if there are any comments, suggestions or feature request
please tell me
The Collection use cases documentation link:
https://netero.renatooliveira.eng.br/en/latest/examples.html
Proof of concept:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=41vViNm1yu4
Regards,
--
Renato Almeida de Oliveira
Engenheiro de Telecomunicações
