In response to feedback from operational security communities,
CAIDA's source address validation measurement project
(https://spoofer.caida.org) is automatically generating monthly
reports of ASes originating prefixes in BGP for systems from which
we received packets with a spoofed source address.
We are publishing these reports to network and security operations
lists in order to ensure this information reaches operational
contacts in these ASes.
This report summarises tests conducted within nld.
Inferred improvements during Jun 2020:
none inferred
Source Address Validation issues inferred during Jun 2020:
ASN Name First-Spoofed Last-Spoofed
8587 Infracom 2019-10-28 2020-06-10
209299 VITOX-TELECOM 2019-12-15 2020-06-11
41436 CloudWebManage-EU 2020-05-22 2020-06-06
207176 OPENFIBER 2020-06-12 2020-06-12
Further information for these tests where we received spoofed
packets is available at:
https://spoofer.caida.org/recent_tests.php?country_include=nld&no_block=1
Please send any feedback or suggestions to spoofer-info(a)caida.org
Hi all,
Wednesday 22 July NLNOG organizes NLNOG Live! A virtual event with interesting talks and a live demo.
There’s no need to register just “tune in” at 14:00 CEST (12:00 UTC) for the live stream via YouTube and www.nlnog.net
Agenda:
Start time Topic Presenter (Affiliation) slides
14:00 – 14:05 Welcome Nathalie Trenaman (NLNOG)
14:05 – 14:30 Bits of Freedom Update Evelyn Austin (Bits of Freedom)
14:30 – 15:00 BGPAlerter Live Demo Massimo Candela (NTT)
15:00 – 15:15 Coffee break
15:15 – 15:45 How to prepare your budget for next year Jochem de Ruig (Freedom Internet)
15:45 – 16:30 Out-of-Band network management Niels Raijer (Fusix Networks) + Job Snijders (NTT)
16:30 Closing
See https://nlnog.net/nlnog-live/ for further details and information.
Looking forward seeing you July 22!
Cheers,
Melchior
Hi,
Was just looking at https://www.seattleix.net/rs-drops which is nice work but then saw that reference to http://bgpfilterguide.nlnog.net/guides/no_transit_leaks/ ...
Any chance you could update the known transit-free networks; as that's more than just a little outdated. I mean you've got like 209, 702, 3549, 3561 and 4134 still in there and are actually missing 3491, 6830 and 12956.
Thanks,
Steven Van Steen
Director Data Interconnect
Operation & Integration
T + 31 20 778 8537
Liberty Global B.V.
Boeing Avenue 53
1119 PE Schiphol-Rijk
The Netherlands
Hi Steven,
The BGPFilterguide has a Github setup for the site : https://github.com/nlnog/bgpfilterguide
If you feel there is something that should be added, feel free to add the required information.
Regards,
Erik Bais
From: NLNOG <nlnog-bounces(a)nlnog.net> on behalf of "nlnog(a)nlnog.net" <nlnog(a)nlnog.net>
Reply-To: "Van Steen, Steven" <svansteen(a)libertyglobal.com>
Date: Tuesday 16 June 2020 at 14:08
To: "info(a)seattleix.net" <info(a)seattleix.net>, "nlnog(a)nlnog.net" <nlnog(a)nlnog.net>
Subject: [NLNOG] outdated transit-free AS list
Hi,
Was just looking at https://www.seattleix.net/rs-drops which is nice work but then saw that reference to http://bgpfilterguide.nlnog.net/guides/no_transit_leaks/ …
Any chance you could update the known transit-free networks; as that’s more than just a little outdated. I mean you’ve got like 209, 702, 3549, 3561 and 4134 still in there and are actually missing 3491, 6830 and 12956.
Thanks,
Steven Van Steen
Director Data Interconnect
Operation & Integration
T + 31 20 778 8537
Liberty Global B.V.
Boeing Avenue 53
1119 PE Schiphol-Rijk
The Netherlands
Hi!
Ik heb nog drie Dell M520 servers liggen:
- Dual Xeon E5-2430L 2.0Ghz
- Geen RAM (12 sloten)
- iDRAC7 Enterprise met 8GB vFlash
- Dual SD card reader met twee 2GB cards
Service tags: HB36KY1, D546KY1, H936KY1
Ze zijn niet heel veel meer waard, maar als iemand een bod wil doen dan doneer ik de opbrengst aan de Global NOG Alliance (nogalliance.org) waar ik één van de oprichters van ben.
Ik heb ook nog een M1000E/VRTX Blank blade filler liggen, gratis af te halen ;)
Cheers!
Sander
In response to feedback from operational security communities,
CAIDA's source address validation measurement project
(https://spoofer.caida.org) is automatically generating monthly
reports of ASes originating prefixes in BGP for systems from which
we received packets with a spoofed source address.
We are publishing these reports to network and security operations
lists in order to ensure this information reaches operational
contacts in these ASes.
This report summarises tests conducted within nld.
Inferred improvements during May 2020:
ASN Name Fixed-By
6830 LGI-UPC 2020-05-27
Further information for the inferred remediation is available at:
https://spoofer.caida.org/remedy.php
Source Address Validation issues inferred during May 2020:
ASN Name First-Spoofed Last-Spoofed
44684 MYTHIC 2018-02-25 2020-05-15
8587 Infracom 2019-10-28 2020-05-27
209299 VITOX-TELECOM 2019-12-15 2020-05-16
208046 HostSlick-Germany 2020-05-13 2020-05-13
41436 CloudWebManage-EU 2020-05-22 2020-05-29
Further information for these tests where we received spoofed
packets is available at:
https://spoofer.caida.org/recent_tests.php?country_include=nld&no_block=1
Please send any feedback or suggestions to spoofer-info(a)caida.org
In response to feedback from operational security communities,
CAIDA's source address validation measurement project
(https://spoofer.caida.org) is automatically generating monthly
reports of ASes originating prefixes in BGP for systems from which
we received packets with a spoofed source address.
We are publishing these reports to network and security operations
lists in order to ensure this information reaches operational
contacts in these ASes.
This report summarises tests conducted within nld.
Inferred improvements during Apr 2020:
ASN Name Fixed-By
6830 LGI-UPC 2020-04-21
Further information for the inferred remediation is available at:
https://spoofer.caida.org/remedy.php
Source Address Validation issues inferred during Apr 2020:
ASN Name First-Spoofed Last-Spoofed
9009 M247 2017-01-10 2020-04-02
48693 NTSERVICE 2020-04-05 2020-04-06
Further information for these tests where we received spoofed
packets is available at:
https://spoofer.caida.org/recent_tests.php?country_include=nld&no_block=1
Please send any feedback or suggestions to spoofer-info(a)caida.org
Dear all,
Now that most of us are working from home, events are cancelled or
postponed and so we have less social interaction as a community, we are
organising a daily virtual Coffee Break. During the break we can have our
daily moment at the coffee machine.
When: daily @ 11am
Where:
https://nlnog-net.zoom.us/j/97671084794?pwd=cG11aTUxbkFmTmlYUUZ5cFFGaUxMUT09
More detail: https://nlnog.net/nlnog-coffee-break/
Looking forward to seeing you there.
Cheers,
Melchior
Beste mede-netwerkers,
Over 2 weken is er weer de RIPE "General Meeting" waarbij gestemd gaat
worden voor 3 zetels in het Executive Board van RIPE NCC. Deze
verkiezingen zijn belangrijk: we maken allemaal gebruik van IP addressen
(wat moeten we anders weggeven bij de NLNOG Quiz?!) en hebben baat bij
een stabiele organisatie voor de registratie van Internet nummers.
Volgens de nummbers op https://www.ripe.net/participate/meetings/gm/meetings/may-2020
lijken er nog niet zo heel veel Nederlandse RIPE members zich
geregistreerd te hebben!
Om te stemmen moeten members zich *vooraf* registreren, dit kan met een
paar muisklikken via:
https://www.ripe.net/participate/meetings/gm/meetings/may-2020/registration
RIPE NCC's bestuur is verantwoordelijk voor de financieen, wat weer
invloed heeft op hoeveel geld er beschikbaar is om zaken als RPKI, RIPE
RIS draaiende te houden. Als je tevreden bent met hoe dingen gaan op dit
moment, dan is een stem uitbrengen de ideale methode dat zo te houden!
Voorkom eventuele spijt de stembus gemist te hebben na het horen van de
uitslag, dus registreer vandaag! :-)
Met vriendelijke groeten,
Job
In response to feedback from operational security communities,
CAIDA's source address validation measurement project
(https://spoofer.caida.org) is automatically generating monthly
reports of ASes originating prefixes in BGP for systems from which
we received packets with a spoofed source address.
We are publishing these reports to network and security operations
lists in order to ensure this information reaches operational
contacts in these ASes.
This report summarises tests conducted within nld.
Inferred improvements during Mar 2020:
ASN Name Fixed-By
9009 M247 2020-03-04
6830 LGI-UPC 2020-03-22
Further information for the inferred remediation is available at:
https://spoofer.caida.org/remedy.php
Source Address Validation issues inferred during Mar 2020:
ASN Name First-Spoofed Last-Spoofed
31400 ACCELERATED-IT 2016-02-18 2020-03-12
9009 M247 2017-01-10 2020-03-24
1136 KPN 2019-09-04 2020-03-03
8587 Infracom 2019-10-28 2020-03-12
209299 VITOX-TELECOM 2019-12-15 2020-03-10
Further information for these tests where we received spoofed
packets is available at:
https://spoofer.caida.org/recent_tests.php?country_include=nld&no_block=1
Please send any feedback or suggestions to spoofer-info(a)caida.org
