Hi,
We hebben in de afgelopen week een aantal machines van klanten gezien bij verschillende ISP's die een serieuze hoeveelheid SSH scan's doen.
De hoeveelheid verkeer die de scan's genereren kan aardig oplopen .. ik heb 80Mbit gezien vanaf sommige machines..
Hoewel het redelijk snel op te lossen is, leek het maandag / dinsdag wel alsof er niets anders te doen was ..
Hebben meer mensen dit gezien in de afgelopen week / maand ?
Het lijkt te maken te hebben met (http://isc.sans.edu/diary.html?storyid=9370&rss ) een oudere versie van PHPMyAdmin en uiteraard klanten die hun machine niet up to date houden .. Een vrij slechte combi ..
Meer info:
http://netblog.aegaeon.ca/2010/08/10/botnet-trend-phpmyadmin-ssh-attacks/#m…http://www.dslreports.com/forum/r24640843-Botnet-Trend-phpMyAdmin-SSH-Attac…
Mvg,
Erik Bais
Hoi allen,
pas kreeg ik van een gewaardeerde collega nogmaals de tip om toch eens op het NLNOG IRC kanaal te kijken.
Nou is het al niet meer undernet en het channel pw van toen werkt ook niet meer. Nu moet ik eerst inloggen.
Kan iemand me helpen met toegang tot #nlnog in zijn huidige vorm?? ;)
Alvast dank!
Ramses Rodenburg
managed hosting
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P Please consider the environment before printing this e-mail
Colleagues,
Following advanced notice sent to this list on 2010-08-03, the IANA
testbed was shut down on 2010-09-03.
For more details on the IANA DNSSEC testbed, see <https://ns.iana.org/>.
For more details on DNSSEC deployment in the Root Zone, see
<http://www.root-dnssec.org/>.
Queries to the nameserver bound to NS.IANA.ORG (208.77.188.32,
2620:0:2d0:1::32) now fail with ICMP type 3 code 3 (Destination
Unreachable, Port Unreachable).
We suggest that anybody using the DNSSEC testbed for anything
resembling production services make plans to stop doing so at their
earliest convenience, if operational necessity has not already made
that obvious.
ICANN would once again like to thank Packet Clearing House (PCH)
and Dyn.com DynTLD for their support and generous donation of global
DNS resources to the IANA DNSSEC testbed.
Regards,
Joe Abley
Director DNS Operations, ICANN
Hi all,
Ik geef ruimschoots toe dat ik de afgelopen twee jaar onder een steen
heb gelegen, maar what ever happened to het IRC kanaal?
--
Met vriendelijke groet,
Ad Trouwborst
VIVOR B.V.
Internet voor
professionals
T. 035 - 52 394 16
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E. info at vivor.net
> ICANN would like to thank Packet Clearing House (PCH) and Dun.com
> DynTLD for their support and generous donation of global DNS
> resources to the IANA DNSSEC testbed.
My apologies to the good people at Dyn -- of course, that should be
dyn.com, not what I wrote.
Joe
Colleagues,
ICANN has operated the IANA DNSSEC testbed, serving non-production,
signed versions of the root, ARPA, IN-ADDR.ARPA, IP6.ARPA, IRIS.ARPA,
URN.ARPA, and INT zones for several years. Following the recent
completion of DNSSEC deployment in the root zone, this testbed is
scheduled to be decommissioned.
For more details on the IANA DNSSEC testbed, see
<https://ns.iana.org/dnssec/>.
For more details on DNSSEC deployment in the Root Zone, see
<http://www.root-dnssec.org>.
At the time that the service is decommissioned, the nameserver bound
to NS.IANA.ORG (208.77.188.32, 2620:0:2d0:1::32) will be shut down
and DNS queries to NS.IANA.ORG will fail with ICMP type 3 code 3
(Destination Unreachable, Port Unreachable).
We suggest that anybody using the DNSSEC testbed for anything
resembling production services make plans to stop doing so at their
earliest convenience.
ICANN would like to thank Packet Clearing House (PCH) and Dun.com
DynTLD for their support and generous donation of global DNS resources
to the IANA DNSSEC testbed.
DRAFT TIMELINE
Wed 2010-08-03 First public notice (this message)
Wed 2010-08-25 Second public notice (reminder)
Wed 2010-09-01 IANA DNSSEC Testbed is shut down
Wed 2010-09-01 Third public notice (confirming work complete)
Regards,
Joe Abley
Director DNS Operations, ICANN
Root Zone DNSSEC Deployment
Technical Status Update 2010-07-16
This is the twelfth of a series of technical status updates intended
to inform a technical audience on progress in signing the root zone
of the DNS.
RESOURCES
Details of the project, including documentation published to date,
can be found at <http://www.root-dnssec.org/>.
We'd like to hear from you. If you have feedback for us, please
send it to rootsign at icann.org.
FULL PRODUCTION SIGNED ROOT ZONE
The transition from Deliberately-Unvalidatable Root Zone (DURZ) to
production signed root zone took place on 2010-07-15 at 2050 UTC. The
first full production signed root zone had SOA serial 2010071501. There
have been no reported harmful effects. The root zone trust anchor can
be found at <https://data.iana.org/root-anchors/>.
PLANNED DEPLOYMENT SCHEDULE
Already completed:
2010-01-27: L starts to serve DURZ
2010-02-10: A starts to serve DURZ
2010-03-03: M, I start to serve DURZ
2010-03-24: D, K, E start to serve DURZ
2010-04-14: B, H, C, G, F start to serve DURZ
2010-05-05: J starts to serve DURZ
2010-06-16: First Key Signing Key (KSK) Ceremony
2010-07-12: Second Key Signing Key (KSK) Ceremony
2010-07-15: Distribution of validatable, production, signed root
zone; publication of root zone trust anchor
Root Zone DNSSEC Deployment
Technical Status Update 2010-07-14
This is the eleventh of a series of technical status updates intended
to inform a technical audience on progress in signing the root zone
of the DNS.
RESOURCES
Details of the project, including documentation published to date,
can be found at <http://www.root-dnssec.org/>.
We'd like to hear from you. If you have feedback for us, please
send it to rootsign at icann.org.
KSK CEREMONY 2 COMPLETE
The second KSK ceremony for the root zone was completed this week
in El Segundo, CA, USA. The Ceremony Administrator was Mehmet Akcin.
The second production Key Signing Request (KSR) generated by VeriSign
has now been processed by ICANN using the root zone KSK generated
in KSK Ceremony 1, and the resulting Signed Key Response (SKR) has
been accepted by VeriSign. This SKR contains signatures for Q4 2010,
for use between 2010-10-01 and 2010-12-31.
Audit materials relating to both the first and second ceremonies
will be published today at <http://www.iana.org/dnssec/>.
FULL PRODUCTION SIGNED ROOT ZONE
The transition from Deliberately-Unvalidatable Root Zone (DURZ) to
production signed root zone is scheduled take place on 2010-07-15
within a maintenance window which begins at 1930 UTC and ends at
2330 UTC. This is the usual window for the generation and distribution
of root zones with SOA serials ending in 01.
PLANNED DEPLOYMENT SCHEDULE
Already completed:
2010-01-27: L starts to serve DURZ
2010-02-10: A starts to serve DURZ
2010-03-03: M, I start to serve DURZ
2010-03-24: D, K, E start to serve DURZ
2010-04-14: B, H, C, G, F start to serve DURZ
2010-05-05: J starts to serve DURZ
2010-06-16: First Key Signing Key (KSK) Ceremony
2010-07-12: Second Key Signing Key (KSK) Ceremony
To come:
2010-07-15: Distribution of validatable, production, signed root
zone; publication of root zone trust anchor
(Please note that this schedule is tentative and subject to change
based on testing results or other unforeseen factors.)
Root Zone DNSSEC Deployment
Technical Status Update 2010-07-10
This is the tenth of a series of technical status updates intended
to inform a technical audience on progress in signing the root zone
of the DNS.
RESOURCES
Details of the project, including documentation published to date,
can be found at <http://www.root-dnssec.org/>.
We'd like to hear from you. If you have feedback for us, please
send it to rootsign at icann.org.
KSK CEREMONY 2
The second KSK ceremony for the root zone will take place in El
Segundo, CA, USA on Monday 2010-07-12. The ceremony is scheduled
to begin at 1300 local time (2000 UTC) and is expected to end by
1900 local time (0200 UTC).
Video from Ceremony 2 will be recorded for audit purposes, as with
Ceremony 1. Video and associated audit materials will be published
before the signed root enters full production on 2010-07-15. Details
will be circulated before that date.
ICANN will operate a separate camera whose video will not be retained
for audit purposes, but which will instead be streamed live in order
to provide remote observers an opportunity to watch the ceremony.
The live stream will be provided on a best-effort basis.
The live video stream will be available at:
http://dns.icann.org/ksk/stream/
FULL PRODUCTION SIGNED ROOT ZONE
The transition from Deliberately-Unvalidatable Root Zone (DURZ) to
production signed root zone will take place on 2010-07-15.
Trust anchor publication, according to draft-icann-dnssec-trust-anchor-00
will take place after the maintenance window closes, once a final
set of tests have been completed by ICANN and the results have been
found to be positive.
FTP ACCESS TO SIGNED ZONE FILES
Following the transition on 2010-07-15 the unsigned root and ARPA
zone files published at
ftp://rs.internic.net/domain/ftp://ftp.internic.net/domain/
will be replaced by signed zone files. That is, the zone files
retrieved from both FTP servers will contain DNSSEC data, and will
hence faithfully represent the zones being served by root servers.
PLANNED DEPLOYMENT SCHEDULE
Already completed:
2010-01-27: L starts to serve DURZ
2010-02-10: A starts to serve DURZ
2010-03-03: M, I start to serve DURZ
2010-03-24: D, K, E start to serve DURZ
2010-04-14: B, H, C, G, F start to serve DURZ
2010-05-05: J starts to serve DURZ
2010-06-16: First Key Signing Key (KSK) Ceremony
To come:
2010-07-12: Second Key Signing Key (KSK) Ceremony
2010-07-15: Distribution of validatable, production, signed root
zone; publication of root zone trust anchor
(Please note that this schedule is tentative and subject to change
based on testing results or other unforeseen factors.)
Root Zone DNSSEC Deployment
Technical Status Update 2010-06-18
This is the ninth of a series of technical status updates intended
to inform a technical audience on progress in signing the root zone
of the DNS.
RESOURCES
Details of the project, including documentation published to date,
can be found at <http://www.root-dnssec.org/>.
We'd like to hear from you. If you have feedback for us, please
send it to rootsign at icann.org.
KSK CEREMONY 1 COMPLETE
The first KSK ceremony for the root zone was completed this week
in Culpeper, VA, USA. The Ceremony Administrator was Mehmet Akcin.
The first production KSK has now been generated. This is the key
that is scheduled to be put into service on 2010-07-15.
The first production Key Signing Request (KSR) generated by VeriSign
has now been processed by ICANN using the root zone KSK, and the
resulting Signed Key Response (KSR) has been accepted by VeriSign.
This SKR contains signatures for Q3 2010, for use between 2010-07-01
and 2010-09-30.
Audit materials relating to the first ceremony will be published
as soon as is practical, and in particular before 2010-07-15.
The KSK and SKR generated during this ceremony will not be approved
for production until the KSK key pair has been successfully transported
to ICANN's west-coast ceremony facility in El Segundo, CA, USA, and
placed in secure storage.
KSK CEREMONY 2 SCHEDULED
The second KSK ceremony for the root zone is scheduled to take place
in El Segundo, CA, USA on 2010-07-12. Replication of key materials
onto west-coast HSMs, enrolment of west-coast crypto officers and
processing of the Q4 2010 KSR (for production use between 2010-10-01
and 2010-12-31) will take place during this ceremony.
PLANNED DEPLOYMENT SCHEDULE
Already completed:
2010-01-27: L starts to serve DURZ
2010-02-10: A starts to serve DURZ
2010-03-03: M, I start to serve DURZ
2010-03-24: D, K, E start to serve DURZ
2010-04-14: B, H, C, G, F start to serve DURZ
2010-05-05: J starts to serve DURZ
2010-06-16: First Key Signing Key (KSK) Ceremony
To come:
2010-07-12: Second Key Signing Key (KSK) Ceremony
2010-07-15: Distribution of validatable, production, signed root
zone; publication of root zone trust anchor
(Please note that this schedule is tentative and subject to change
based on testing results or other unforeseen factors.)
